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JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, jurisdiction over this matter lies with the Utah Supreme
Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ADDRESSED
IN AMICUS BRIEF
and
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue addressed in this Brief of the Amicus
Curiae is the constitutional propriety the District Court's
granting of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and denial of
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
The standard of appellate review in summary judgment
matters has been succinctly stated by the Utah Supreme Court as

In considering an appeal from a grant of
summary judgment, we view the facts in a
light most favorable to the losing party
below. (Citations omitted.) And in
determining whether those facts require, as a
matter of law, the entry of judgment for the
prevailing party below, we give no deference
to the trial court's conclusions of law:
those conclusions are reviewed for
correctness. (Citations omitted.)
Blue Cross and Blue Shield vs. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (1989).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
First Amendment, Constitution of the United States
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
1

free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.
Article I, Section 4, Constitution of Utah
The rights of conscience shall never be
infringed. The State shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no
religious test shall be required as a
qualification for any office of public trust
or for any vote at any election; nor shall
any person be incompetent as a witness or
juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of
Church and State, nor shall any church
dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall
be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment.
. ..
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action began on September 26, 1991, when the
Plaintiffs filed an action against the Defendants seeking to
enjoin the Defendants from expending "any public funds, resources
or property in support of prayers" at the Defendants' city
council meetings and to enjoin the Defendants from "allowing or
having prayers at City Council meetings."

The Plaintiffs also

sought a judgment declaring all past expenditures by the
Defendants for such activities to have been in violation of
Article I, Section 4, Constitution of Utah.

The Plaintiffs also

sought their costs.
The proceedings below included exchanges of discovery
information that led to cross motions for summary judgment.
2

The

District Court issued a Memorandum Decision on March 2, 1992,
which was subsequently followed by an Order Granting Summary
Judgment on April 9, 1992, wherein the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment was granted and the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment was denied.

The Defendants were thereby

enjoined from allowing or having prayers at the Salt Lake City
Council's meetings and from expending public funds, resources or
property to support or encourage prayers.

The Defendants were

also ordered to pay the Plaintiffs' costs.
A Notice of Appeal was filed by the Defendants on May
1, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this Amicus Brief, and in light of the
standard of appellate review which requires the court to view the
facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below, the
Amicus Curiae adopts verbatim the entire statement of "Undisputed
Facts" in the Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Record pages 192 through 203.)

However, only those particular paragraphs referred to in the
Amicus Brief, without footnotes or attachments, will be stated
below:
1.
On March 4, 1895, as commanded by the Enabling
Act, delegates from across Utah convened for Utah's
final Constitutional Convention. The Convention was
opened with a prayer offered by President George Q.
Cannon of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints. (Proceedings, p. 9.) Over the next 66 days
the delegates had 55 public business meetings. On 54
of those days prayers were offered. At least 31
assorted ministers, reverends and elders representing
at least 14 different religious congregations gave
3

prayers. Two military chaplains, a lieutenant from the
Salvation Army and 18 different delegates also led the
Convention in prayer. (A compilation of the prayer
information is attached and incorporated as Exhibit
"B M .) Among the different churches represented in
prayer were Methodist Episcopalians, Presbyterians,
Lutherans, Mormons, Baptists, African Methodist
Episcopalians, Unitarians, Scandinavian Methodist
Episcopalians, Swedish Lutherans, Congregationalists
and the just plain vanilla Episcopalians. (Memorandum
in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
paragraph 2, Record pages 192 and 193. )
2.
The Convention made it clear that the wide variety
of religious faiths and other sentiments represented in
their opening ceremonies was representative of the
diverse beliefs of the community and the Convention's
spirit of religious tolerance and freedom:
MR. CANNON:

Mr. President, I move the name of the church
of which the reverend gentleman offering
prayer is a member be inserted after his
name, and I would like to request that this
be done in each case since the opening of the
Convention. I find by reference to our
minutes of the first day, the name of the
gentleman who offered prayer and also the
church with which he is associated was given,
and I think this should be done in each case,
the obiect of the mover of the motion having
been to show to the public that a freedom of
religious sentiment prevailed in the
Convention.

Proceedings, p. 105. (Emphasis added.) (Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
paragraph 3, Record pages 193 and 194.)
3.
The first session of the State Legislature which
occurred after the adoption of the 1895 Constitution
(including Article I, Section 4) and admission of Utah as a
State by the United States Congress, occurred on January 6,
1896. Both the Special Session called to fix the date for
the General Session, and the General Session itself, were
opened with prayers. (See Journal of the House, pp. 16 and
29, which are part of Exhibit "E" attached and incorporated
by reference.) To the best of the City's knowledge, the
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has
continued to this date. (Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, paragraph 13,
Record pages 197 and 198.)
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

Legislative Prayer Does Not Violate The Constitution of
the United States.
In United States Supreme Court decisions over the last

decade the right to conduct legislative prayers has been
consistently found to not violate the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

POINT II;

Legislative Prayer Does Not Violate The Constitution
of the State of Utah.
The Utah Supreme Court should go beyond the Federal

Constitution and determine how Utah's Constitution affects
legislative prayer.
Utah's Constitution, as a document, is ambiguous in its
treatment of legislative prayer.
reviewed.

The drafter's intent should be

The drafters' behavior, which evidences their intent,

was such that no absolute, unconditional bar to legislative
prayer can be reasonably inferred.

Instead, the drafters appear

to have intended to create only an establishment clause
protection.

When this protection is applied to legislative

prayer in city council meetings, no real threat that a state
religion will be established exists and, consequently,
legislative prayers should be allowed.
Utah case law on this issue further supports an
establishment clause protection interpretation, rather than an
absolute, unconditional bar.

This conclusion is further

supported by reviewing Washington's interpretations of a similar
constitutional provision.

Finally, the absolute, separationist views of the
Plaintiffs and the trial court go too far.

Such a view would

require a finding that anything religion based, such as Utah's
Pioneer Day and Christmas Day holidays would have to be
unconstitutional, because they bestow obvious benefits on the
Mormon Church and on the Christian religion.
Legislative prayers as conducted by Salt Lake City or
any similarly situated city or town should not be found to be
unconstitutional.

They do not violate Utah's Constitutional

establishment clause provision.
ARGUMENT
I.

Legislative Prayer Does Not Violate the Constitution of
the United States.
The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled

that legislative prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution.

Marsh vs.

Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
The Marsh case involved the Nebraska Legislature's
practice of beginning each of its sessions with a prayer, offered
by a paid clergyman, who was selected by an agent of the
legislature.

A member of the legislature sued to enjoin the

practice as violative of the First Amendment.

The trial court

ruled that the prayers were non-violative, but that payment of
the chaplain from public funds was violative.

The Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals reviewed the entire matter and applied the
three-part test of Lemon vs. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct.
2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), and ruled that the use of the paid
6

clergy violated the Lemon test.

The United State Supreme Court

reversed this decision.
In Marsh, Chief Justice Burger begins his analysis by a
summary of the history of legislative prayer, as follows:
The opening of sessions of legislative and
other deliberative public bodies with prayer
is deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of this country. From colonial
times through the founding of the Republic
and ever since, the practice of legislative
prayer has coexisted with the principles of
disestablishment and religious freedom. In
the very courtrooms in which the United
States District Judge and later three Circuit
Judges heard and decided this case, the
proceedings opened with an announcement that
concluded, "God save the United States and
this Honorable Court." The same invocation
occurs at all sessions of this Court.

Although prayers were not offered during the
Constitutional Convention, the First
Congress, as one of its early items of
business, adopted the policy of selecting a
chaplain to open each session with prayer.

Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment
Religion Clause did not view paid legislative
chaplains and opening prayers as a violation
of that Amendment, for the practice of
opening sessions with prayer has continued
without interruption ever since that early
session of Congress. It has also been
followed consistently in most of the states,
including Nebraska, where the institution of
opening legislative sessions with prayer was
adopted even before the State attained
statehood. . . .
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-789.
He then states that although historical patterns cannot justify
contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees, they do
7

reveal the drafter's intent.

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.

He finally

concludes that
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken
history of more than 200 years, there can be
no doubt that the practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer has become
part of the fabric of our society. To invoke
Divine guidance on a public body entrusted
with making the laws is not, in these
circumstances, an "establishment" of religion
or a step toward establishment; it is simply
a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely
held among the people of this country.
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
In the United States Supreme Court's most recent prayer
ruling, Lee vs. Weisman, 60 L.W. 4723 (1992), wherein the court
struck down the practice of prayer at high school graduations, it
reaffirmed the constitutional nature of legislative prayers,
wherein it stated as follows:
Inherent differences between the public
school system and a session of a State
Legislature distinguish this case from Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The
considerations we have raised in objection to
the invocation and benediction are in many
respects similar to the arguments we
considered in Marsh. But there are also
obvious differences. The atmosphere at the
opening of a session of a state legislature
where adults are free to enter and leave with
little comment and for any number of reasons
cannot compare with the constraining
potential of the one school event most
important for the student to attend. The
influence and force of a formal exercise in a
school graduation are far greater than the
prayer exercise we condoned in Marsh. . . .
Lee, 60 L.W. at 4728.
Legislative prayer, as practiced by the United States
Congress, the various state legislatures and various other
8

legislative bodies, such as the Salt Lake City Council and other
similarly situated cities and towns, is not violative of the
United States Constitution.

II.
A.

Legislative Prayer Does Not Violate the Constitution
of the State of Utah.

Introduction
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution

reads as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.
First Amendment, Constitution of the United States.
The comparable, relevant portion of the Constitution of
the State of Utah reads as follows:
The rights of conscience shall never be
infringed. The State shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no
religious test shall be required as a
qualification for any office of public trust
or for any vote at any election; nor shall
any person be incompetent as a witness or
juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of
Church and State, nor shall any church
dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall
be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment. . . .
Article I, Section 4, Constitution of Utah.

9

It is apparent by quick comparison of both
constitutional provisions, that the State constitutional
provision is more detailed.

This was also observed by Justice

Crockett in a concurring opinion that interpreted this clause of
Utah's Constitution, wherein he stated,
It seems to me that this case should be
decided upon the Constitution and laws of the
state of Utah. It is to be noted that the
provision of Section 4, Article I, of the
Utah Constitution, which our decision
quotes, is more articulate and express in
assuring religious liberty and prohibiting
discrimination, or church interference with
private or public rights, than the generality
of the First Amendment of the U. S.
Constitution.
Manning vs. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549, at 552, 553 (1973).
In keeping with Justice Crockett's recommendation
regarding the application of Section 4 of Article I of Utah's
Constitution to questions relating to religious liberty,
prohibiting discrimination, and church interference, this court
should go beyond the Federal Constitution and look closely at how
Utah's Constitution affects legislative prayer.

B.

Legislative Intent
A logical starting point in the analysis of any

provision of Utah's Constitution is to look at the drafter's
intent underlying the questioned provision.
This logical approach appears to be challenged by the
Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs and trial court would have everyone

believe that the language of the Utah Constitution is so clear
that you need look no further.
10

However, even a cursory review of the Utah
Constitution, with respect to the legislative prayer issue, leads
one to question the clarity of the document.

The opening words

of the Constitution's Preamble are a prayer of thanksgiving:
Grateful to Almighty
liberty, we the people of
secure and perpetuate the
government, do ordain and
CONSTITUTION.

God for life and
Utah, in order to
principles of free
establish this

Preamble, Constitution of Utah.
Yet, four short paragraphs later in Section 4 the
Plaintiffs assert that there is an absolute, unconditional bar to
legislative prayer.
Then, Article VIII, Section 2(2)(c), grants churches a
property tax exemption, which financially benefits them.
There is some Utah case law that appears to require
uncertainty in the Utah Constitution, before the framers' intent
can be reviewed.

State vs. Betensen, 378 P.2d 669 (Utah 1963).

This required uncertainty appears to be present.

While other,

more recent, case law simply requires the courts to consider the
framers' intent.

P.I.E. Emp. Federal Credit Union vs. Bass, 759

P.2d 1144 (Utah 1988).

In P.I.E. the court stated:

When interpreting constitutional language, it
is appropriate to look to extrinsic evidence
of the framers' intent, (Citations Omitted),
including the record of debates during the
constitutional convention (Citations
Omitted).
P.I.E., 759 P.2d at 1146.
Looking to the framers' intent also allows the courts
to use common sense.

This has been stated as follows:
11

The constitutional provision must be given an
interpretation which is sensible and
realistic in its application to the affairs
of life. To achieve that result it is
necessary to look to the background which
produced it and the purpose it sought to
accomplish.
Gammon vs. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 264 P.2d 417
(Utah 1961).
In order to discern the drafter's intent regarding
legislative prayer, the court need not look far.
Constitutional Convention of 1895, met on 55 days.

The
On 54 of

those days, the delegates to the convention began their meetings
with legislative prayers.
Facts, paragraph 2.

Defendants' statement of Undisputed

The delegates also made it a point to have

in their record a demonstration "to the public that a freedom of
religious sentiment prevailed in the Convention."
statement of Undisputed Facts, paragraph 3.

Defendants'

This statement, by

the delegates, is an affirmation of their intent to have an
establishment of religion protection clause, not a ban on
legislative prayers.
The practice of legislative prayer was carried on by
Utah's first state legislature in 1896.

On January 6, 1896,

there were two sessions held, a special session and a general
session.

Both sessions opened with prayers.

statement of Undisputed Facts, paragraph 13.

Defendants'
If the goal of the

delegates was to stop all prayers in government meetings and not
]ust to create an establishment protection, then why was there no
objection to the new legislature's prayers?
As the court will recall, the Marsh decision, was
based, in part, upon the long-standing practice of allowing
12

legislative prayers, the history of said practice being cited at
length in Marsh.
In the case now before the court, the legislative body
is not the state legislature, but a city's legislature, i.e., a
city council.

There is no case law known, wherein a city or town

has been forbidden to begin its meetings with legislative prayer,
in a state that allows its legislature to begin its sessions with
legislative prayer.

There is no logical or justifiable reason to

treat the state legislature any different than a city
legislature.
The purpose of Section 4 was to incorporate an
establishment clause protection into Utah's Constitution, and not
to implement an absolute, unconditional bar to religious
exercises, such as legislative prayers.
Just as was done in Marsh, the court should look at
whether having allowed legislative prayer in Utah for the last 96
years has led to the establishment of a state religion.

It is

common knowledge that the membership of the state's majority
religion, as a percent of the whole state's population, is
declining.

In short, the establishment clause protection

provided by Section 4, with the exception for legislative prayers
as has existed for the last 96 years, is working.

As Justice

Goldberg stated in his concurring opinion in Abinqton School
District vs. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844
(1963), which was cited favorably in Marsh,
. . . the measure of constitutional
adjudication is the ability and willingness
13

to distinguish between real threat and mere
shadow.
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
Where is the "real threat"?

It has not been proven by

the Plaintiffs.
The delegates to Utah's Constitutional Convention had
no intent to stop legislative prayer when they drafted a detailed
establishment clause.

Their only intent was to create a workable

establishment clause protection for the citizens of Utah.
goal has been accomplished.

That

There is no "real threat" through

continued legislative prayers.

The trial court's ruling against

legislative prayer in the Salt Lake City Council
meetings should be overturned and the practice of legislative
prayer in those meetings found to be Constitutional.

C.

Relevant Utah Case Law Interpretations
There is no Utah decision that has previously

interpreted Section 4's establishment clause protection in a
situation specifically involving legislative prayer.

There are,

however, four Utah cases that offer the court some assistance in
interpreting Section 4.
In each of these cases, the court has treated Section 4
as an establishment clause protection and not as an absolute
prohibition of all religious involvement in a government setting.
The oldest case is Gubler vs. Utah State Teachers'
Retirement Board, 192 P.2d 580 (1948), wherein the Utah Supreme
Court found no violation of Section 4.
14

The claim was that

Section 4 had been violated because certain teachers that had
taught eight years earlier at church run schools were to be
allowed increased state retirement fund benefits because of their
years of teaching at parochial schools.

Thus, the teachers would

receive money from the state for their past religious based
activities.

The court affirmed the State's retirement fund plan,

finding no breaches of the wall between church and state.
Gubler, 192 P.2d at 587.
Gubler was followed a year later by Thomas vs.
Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 197 P.2d 477 (1948), wherein four of
the five justices of Utah's Supreme Court found no violation of
Section 4, while one did find a violation.

In Thomas. the

legislature leased a portion of the state capitol grounds to an
organization known as the Daughters of Utah Prioneers and
provided $150,000.00 to the organization for the construction of
a museum that would display Mormon artifacts and portray the
history of the Mormon Chruch in Utah.

Although the justices did

not couch their language in establishment clause terms as they
reviewed Section 4, they clearly expressed establishment clause
concerns.
There was no bright line, absolutist rule adopted by
the court as a whole or by any of its individual members.

The

key for Justice Pratt was whether there was evidence by the
society of proselyting activity.

Thomas, 197 P.2d at 490.

He

concluded there was not; therefore, the lease and money were not
a violation of Section 4.

Chief Justice McDonough agreed with

Justice Pratt, because he could find no evidence of the
15

organization being involved in propagating the Mormon faith.
Thomas, 197 P.2d at 496.

Justice Latimer agreed with Justice

Prattf while Justice Wade agreed with Justices McDonough and
Latimer.

Thomas, 197 P.2d at 498 and 508.
Justice Wolfe dissented because the members of the

Daughters might be tempted to carry out an express purpose of the
Mormon faith, i.e., to propagate the religion.

Thomas, 197 P.2d

at 516.
The next interpretation of this subject matter was by
the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit in Anderson vs.
Salt Lake City Corporation, 475 F.2d 29, Cert, denied 414 U.S.
879, 94 S.Ct. 50, 38 L.Ed.2d 124 (1973).

This case involved a

request by the Fraternal Order of Eagles to place a permanent,
granite monolith on City and County property, which contained the
Ten Commandments and various other religious symbols.

The City

Commissioners thereafter authorized the installation and
maintenance of lighting equipment to illuminate and enhance the
display, which would cost a nominal amount of money to operate
and maintain.
The court went through a lengthy establishment clause
analysis and concluded as follows:
The wholesome neutrality guaranteed by
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
does not dictate obliteration of all our
religious traditions. . . . Although an
accompanying plaque explaining the secular
significance of the Ten Commandments would be
appropriate in a constitutional sense, we
cannot say that the monument, as it stands,
is more than a depiction of a historically
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important monument with both secular and
sectarian effects.
No one can be the judge of his own
objectivity. It may well be that in this
blurred, indistinct area of our national life
and environment, opinions about the purpose
and effect of the monolith are influenced by
orthodox or unorthodox propensities. But be
that as it may, we are brought to the
conclusion that the monolith is primarily
secular, and not religious in character; that
neither its purpose or effect tends to
establish religious belief.
Anderson, 475 F.2d at 34.
The fourth case has been referenced earlier, Manning
vs. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549 (1973), wherein the Utah Supreme
Court allowed Sevier County and Richfield City to bond for the
purchase of land for and construction of a hospital to be
operated by an entity controlled by of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints.

There was no dispute that the County and

City were bestowing a financial benefit on the operator of the
hospital.

The Supreme Court, while directly addressing Section

4, concluded that the plan "carefully avoided excessive religious
entanglements."

Manning, 517 P.2d at 552.

The court concluded

that all but one aspect of the plan was constitutional.
All four of these cases are treated by the courts as
establishment clause cases.

No case in Utah establishes a bright

line, absolutist view regarding Section 4, as was proposed by the
Plaintiffs and adopted by the trial court in this case.

All four

afforded the citizens of the State of Utah with protection from
the establishment of a state religion, while not forbidding all
involvement by the state or its statutorily created governmental
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units from all involvement with religion.
All four involved the bestowal of some amount of
financial benefit on members of a church, on a church, on
religion in general, or on a church run hospital.

This bestowal

of some amount of financial benefit at first glance may appear to
contradict the "No public money or property shall be
appropriated" language of Section 4.

However, when the entire

Constitution is reviewed, including the words of the Preamble and
Article VIII, in light of its legislative history, then there is
no contradiction.
The bestowal of some small amount of financial benefit
by the Salt Lake City Council in order to begin its meetings with
prayer is not unconstitutional.

The use of a minute or two of

time; the use of a podium; or the use of a pre-arranged schedule
as to who will pray or offer a thought according to non-sectarian
guidelines, are not unconstitutional.

They are not a "real

threat" to the rights of Utah's citizens any more than there was
a real threat in the four Utah cases that have just been
reviewed.
The trial court's absolutist ruling against legislative
prayer in the Salt Lake City Council's meetings or in the
meetings of any other Utah city or town should be reversed.

D.

Relevant Washington Case Law Interpretation
Washington State's Constitution contains an

establishment clause that is similar to Section 4 of Article I
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of Utah's Constitution.

It reads as follows:

"Absolute freedom of conscience in all
matters of religious sentiment, belief, and
worship, shall be guaranteed to every
individual, and no one shall be molested or
disturbed in person, or property, on account
of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as
to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace and
safety of the state. No public money or
property shall be appropriated for, or
applied to any religious worhsip, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment. No religious qualification
shall be required for any public office, or
employment, nor shall any person be
incompetent as a witness, or juror, in
consequence of his opinion on matters of
religion, nor be questioned in any court of
justice touching his religious belief to
affect the weight of his testimony."
Article I, Section 11, Constitution of Washington.
There is no Washington decision that has previously
interpreted Washington's Section 11 establishment clause
protection in a situation involving legislative prayer.

There

are a few Washington cases that address the issue of state
payments for religious instruction.
In the Washington religious instruction cases, the
courts have not treated Washington's Section 11 as an absolute
prohibition provision.

Instead, they have chosen to treat it in

an establishment clause fashion, offering reasonable protection
to the state's citizens, which treatment conforms with Utah's
past treatment of Utah's constitutional provision.

19

The most recent case in Washington is Witters vs. State
Com'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989).

The Witters

case began in 1979, when Mr. Witters was denied financial
assistance for his education, which was to be conducted at a
Christian school with a course of study that would prepare him
for a career as a pastor, missionary or youth director.
771 P.2d at 1120.

Witters,

The case found its way to the United States

Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded the matter, concluding
that direct financial assistance to an individual did not violate
the Federal Constitution pursuant to the Lemon vs. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), but that it
needed to be reviewed in light of the "far stricter" Washington
State Constitution.

474 U.S. 481, 489, 88 L.Ed.2d 846, 106 S.Ct.

748 (1986).
On remand, the Supreme Court of Washington found that
the denial of financial aid to fund an individual's religious
education was the Constitutional course.

The key issue being

that Mr. Witters was seeking to have the State pay for "religious
instruction," instruction that was devotional in nature and
designed to induce faith and belief in the student.

The court

ruled that that activity violated Washington's Section 11
prohibition against appropriation for and application to public
money for religious instruction.

Witters, 111 P.2d at 1122.

Witters court relied on two earlier Washington cases.
In State ex rel Dearie vs. Frazier, 173 P. 35 (Wash. 1918), the
Washington Supreme Court would not allow a school board to give
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high school credits for Bible study done outside of school.

In

Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church vs. Board of Regents, 436 P.2d
189, Cert, denied 393 U.S. 960, 89 S.Ct. 398, 21 L.Ed.2d 372
(1968), the Washington Supreme Court allowed a state university
to teach an English course that reviewed the Bible as literature.
The most crucial portion of the court's analysis is the
following:
There can be no doubt that our
constitutional bars are absolute against
religious instruction and indoctrination in
specific religious beliefs or dogma; but they
do not proscribe open, free, critical, and
scholarly examination of the literature,
experiences, and knowledge of mankind.
Calvary, 436 P.2d at 193.
The key to Washington's analysis comes through the
question in Calvary that asks if the activity is "religious
instruction or indoctrination in specific religious beliefs or
dogma?"

Calvary, 436 P.2d at 193, and Witters, 771 P.2d at 1122.

If the answer is yes, then the activity is constitutionally
forbidden.

Otherwise, there is no "absolute bar."
Applying this test to legislative prayer as was

conducted in the Constitutional Convention in Utah to the
Preamble to Utah's Constitution, to legislative prayers in our
present state legislature, to the Salt Lake City Council on the
date the present action was filed, to the Salt Lake City Council
once its written policy was adopted, and to any other similarly
situated city or town in Utah, the answer is no.
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E.

Other Utah Religious Activities
The State of Utah, along with its cities and towns,

participates in other religious activities that an absolute
separationist view should find unconstitutional.

These

activities all bestow some amount of financial benefit on
religion, which in the Plaintiffs' view should require a finding
of unconstitutionality.
Pioneer Day, July 24th, is by statute, a legal holiday.
Section 63-13-2, Utah Code Annotated as amended.

As Utah's

"statehood" or "discovery" or "settlement" day, it does not fall
on the dates that Utah joined the union, that Utah was discovered
by the colonial powers, or that the first pioneers came into the
Salt Lake Valley, July 22, 1847.

Instead, the legal holiday

recognizes the day that the Mormon Prophet came into the Salt
Lake Valley and declared, "This is the right place," which
statement arose from his earlier having seen the Salt Lake Valley
in a vision.
An absolutist view of Section 4 must clearly require
Utah to not celebrate a Mormon phophet's confirmation of a
vision.

However, Pioneer Day has not been challenged.
Christmas Day, December 25th, is likewise by statute a

legal holiday.

Section 63-13-2, Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

This day is the day that the Christian religion in general
celebrates the birth of its Savior, its most sacred day of the
year.
An absolutist view of Section 4 must clearly require
Utah to not celebrate the Christian religion's most sacred day of
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the year.

However, Christmas has not been challenged.
Each of these holiday examples bestowes obvious

benefits on the Mormon religion or on the Christian religion.

It

does not make sense to claim that those ecclesiastical
organizations are not financially benefited by the government's
acceptance of their religious events as legal holidays.

However,

no one is claiming that the state is in violation of its
Constitution by observing these two religious holidays.
The absolutist view proposed by the Plaintiffs and
adopted by the trial court should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Article I, Section 4, of Utah's Constitution was never
intended to be an absolute, unconditional bar to legislative
prayers in Salt Lake City's council meetings or in any other Utah
city or town.

The drafters of Utah's Constitution made

legislative prayer a part of their actions.

There is no reason

to believe that the drafters intended anything more by Section 4
than to provide Utah citizens with reasonable establishment
clause protection.
Utah's past case law interpretation supports this view,
just as does the State of Washington's past case law
interpretations of a similar constitutional provision.

The

absolutist approach proposed by the Plaintiffs would lead to
unacceptable restrictions, which were definitely not intended by
the drafters and are not necessary to protect the rights of
Utah's citizens.
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The ruling of the District Court should be reversed.
The Court should find against the Plaintiffs and for the
Defendants.

Legislative prayer at city council meetings should

be found to be 3 constitutionally allowed activity.
DATED this 18th day of August, 1992.
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